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REVIEW OF RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY JOURNAL, JULY 1956Editorial

The subject of the editorial (pages 3-13) in Lupta de Clasa of July 1956 is the election of local party organs, described as an important step in the development of internal party democracy.

The editorial recalls that in accordance with the party statute, which provides for the annual election of leading party organs in base, rayon, and city organizations, and for biannual elections in regiune organizations, all party organizations have been ordered by the Central Committee to hold meetings for the purpose of hearing reports on party activity and holding these elections during the months of August, September, and October 1956. The new party organs are reminded that they will be confronted with the problems posed by the heavy demands of the Second Five-Year Plan which calls in industry for fulfillment of the quantitative plans for all types of goods, for raising labor productivity, for reducing production costs, and for improving quality; and in agriculture for strengthening and developing the socialist sector, for increasing per-hectare yields, for extending the area under cultivation, and for increasing the number and quality of livestock.

It is obvious, the editorial continues, that these aims can only be achieved if political and organizational party work is raised to a higher level, the concrete means of achieving which have been spelled out by the Second Party Congress. A notable improvement in party work is already noticeable in many organizations.

The editorial points out that the key to a stronger, more active, and more firmly united party is, as Lenin has shown, the broadest possible internal party democracy, which is based on the election of all the leading party organs, and on their duty to account to their electors periodically for all their actions. For some years, according to the editorial, progress was being made in this direction, meetings and elections were being held more regularly, and the elective principle was being better observed by party organizations. Further progress can be expected, the editorial suggests, following the new instructions on how to conduct local elections, recently elaborated by the Central Committee of the PMR (Rumanian Workers Party).

The party organizations must, of course, be concerned with the proper organization of the elections, the editorial continues, but their main effort must be directed toward raising the level of the electoral meetings, of the reports submitted to the electors, and of the decisions reached, in order to ensure better economic leadership toward fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan. It is very important that the activity reports be a truly collective product of the committees and that every participant in the meetings be encouraged to voice his opinion. Unfortunately, the editorial says, it has often happened in the past that the officers elected to preside over the meetings have, on the contrary, violated party democracy in this respect. Criticism must always be welcome, provided it is constructive and not tainted with liberalism, or abused for the purpose of hurting instead of strengthening the party.

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As provided by the party statute, the editorial states, the party meetings and conferences must elect the bureaus or committees intended to guide the activities of the party organizations toward fulfillment of the party directives. It follows that election of the right people -- that is, of convinced Communists and leaders in production -- to these responsible positions is of particular importance, and the same thing applies to the choice of delegates to raion, city, and regiune party conferences. According to the editorial, the candidates proposed for these positions must also be distinguished for their devotion to party democracy, to people's legality, to their fatherland, to brotherhood with members of racial minorities, and to strengthening ties with the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Party organizations must choose their party organ with an eye to its correct social and national composition, the editorial says, and not, as happened last year in Cluj, Pitesti, and other regiunes, be guided by such considerations as the amount of "free time" a man disposes of, or in institutions, by his administrative rank. The practice of some raion organizations to prepare in advance lists of committee candidates in each commune must also be condemned. Rather, the editorial states, all members must be allowed to exercise the right guaranteed by the party statute to propose, second, or criticize candidates. Another reprehensible practice is the limitation of the number of candidates to the number of committee members to be chosen.

As for the decisions which are to be taken up by the meetings, the editorial continues, the bureaus and committees should go no further than to prepare drafts to be debated and amended instead of, as sometimes happens, submitting a finished text and insisting on its adoption tale quale.

Finally, the editorial recommends that all regiune, raion, and city party committees check on the manner in which meetings and conferences take place in local organizations, especially with an eye to possible violations of party democracy, and also that they provide help and guidance, when desirable, but be careful not to interfere unnecessarily.

Text of Lenin's Testament and Other Lenin Documents

On pages 14-28, Lupta de Clasa prints the Rumanian translation of hereto unpublished Lenin documents, among them his so-called testament, as they appeared in Kommunist, issue No 9, 1956, prefaced by a covering statement of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Production Costs in Consumer Goods Industry

The problem of profitability (rentabilitate) of consumer goods industries is discussed by Simion Constantin (pages 29-37).

The author recalls the provision of the Second Five-Year Plan under which real wages are to be increased 30 percent, chiefly as a result of lower prices for consumer goods, and indicates that the decisive factor will be the ability to lower production costs, which account for the major part of the retail price of goods. Lower production costs can, in turn, only be achieved by increasing labor productivity. Lower sales prices, the author claims without further explanation, will act as a stimulant to the lowering of production costs and thus at the same time increase the profitability of the manufacturing enterprises.

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Production of consumer goods in Rumania, Constantin writes, has improved markedly under the First Five-Year Plan, with regard to both quantity and quality. However, according to him, certain reprehensible practices for the purpose of increasing profitableness have been resorted to in the past and must be eradicated in the future. Among them are the practice of obtaining the approval of the tutelary ministry for charging a high price for an allegedly new model which in fact is cheaper to produce than the older one, and concentrating on the production of expensive items while neglecting the cheaper items in great demand.

Unfortunately, the ministries frequently close their eyes when enterprises abuse their recently granted latitude in planning their production, Constantin says. They forget that such abuses make it impossible for socialism to live up to its principle of subordinating production to the needs of the people. Furthermore, a number of ministries tolerate the substitution of inferior materials in an item without a reduction of its price, or the sale of second-grade goods under a first-grade label.

What the country needs, the author continues, is a real increase in the profitableness of enterprises, not a fictitious one obtained by reprehensible means. Overfulfillment of plans looks very good on paper, but upon close examination it is often found to constitute a regress rather than progress. For example, Constantin says, the balance sheet for 1955 of enterprises producing household appliances shows excess profits of 21,149,000 lei. But when the figures are analyzed, it is found that these profits were obtained exclusively from new articles, while profits from articles produced also in previous years were actually below the planned figures. This, he says, proves that the increased profits were really the result of inflated prices and not of increased efficiency.

According to Constantin, party organizations in enterprises should exercise to the fullest extent their right to check on managerial practices in order to increase profitableness for the general good of the masses, and not for the selfish advantage of individual enterprises.

History of the Rumanian Communist Party

The campaign against the cult of personality is continued this month by Lupta de Clasa in an article (pages 38-55) by M. Frunza on the role of the masses in the setting up of the People's Democracy in Rumania.

Frunza writes that the cult of Stalin's personality is chiefly to blame for the inadequacy of the available studies of the part played by the popular masses in the events which led to the creation of the Communist regime in Rumania. As a result, the creative role of the Rumanian Communist Party was not properly appreciated and the absurd theory of the "export of revolution" was not sufficiently combated.

The author denounces as fallacious the theories of the Peasant (Taranist) Party leaders, who in the 1920s and 1930s argued that the peasant class could and should be the ruling class in Rumania, and of liberals and socialists, who advocated reforms in the capitalist system on the ground that the Rumanian proletariat was too weak to seize power. Only the Communists argued correctly, he says, that the proletariat, allied with the exploited peasants and the small bourgeoisie, was able to overthrow the exploiters.

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The revolutionary movement which ended with the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord regime was, according to the author, the outgrowth of the struggle of the entire people for liberation from the fascist yoke. He says his fellow Communists who talked of the bourgeois-landlord regime as of a unitary bloc were wrong. Actually it was deeply split; for, because fascism was the bloody dictatorship of the most reactionary circles of monopolistic capitalism, it was opposed by many members of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, white-collar workers, artisans, etc., the majority of whom were starving in the 1930s. Even many large capitalists suffered from the inroads of Hitlerite capital in Rumanian industry and from the Hitlerite "agrarianization" policy. These facts, the author says, together with the events at the front, explain the attitude of part of the Rumanian bourgeoisie before, during, and after 23 August 1944.

On 6 September 1941, he continues his account, the Rumanian Communist Party had issued its call for collaboration with all parties and individuals, "the only criterion being their attitude toward the Hitlerite occupants, their Rumanian lackeys, and the criminal war against the USSR."

Encouraged by the victorious advance of the Soviet liberators, says Frunza, the party proceeded to work out its plan for the overthrow of the Antonescu dictatorship. On 1 May 1944, the party was able to set up the Single Workers Front, as a result of a shift toward the left in the Social Democratic Party. The next step was to prepare the armed insurrection, the only means of overthrowing the military-fascist dictatorship of Antonescu. The avowed objectives, the author states, were the popular ones of withdrawing from the criminal anti-Soviet war and fighting the Hitlerite invaders.

Those historians, among them the author of an article in *Studii*, No 2/1954, who believe the armed insurrection of 23 August 1944 was the work of a small group of men, are mistaken, according to the author. That would have been quite impossible, he says, for it would contradict Lenin's teachings on successful insurrection; the truth was that the conditions enunciated by Lenin had been fulfilled by the victorious advance into Rumania of the Red Army and the struggle against fascism of the whole people whose actions were coordinated by the Communist Party.

An important result of the overthrow of the dictatorship was the legalization of the Communist Party, but, Frunza explains, "one of the old contradictions of Rumanian society" was revived, for the party which had successfully organized the insurrection obtained merely formal representation in the new government. However, he says, the forces of reaction had been mortally wounded by the popular insurrection and the "liberating mission performed in our country by the Soviet Army"; and the party, in obedience to Lenin's precepts, proceeded to assume the leadership of the popular movement. Membership in trade unions of which the Communists obtained control grew rapidly, and the campaign launched among the peasants to incite them under worker's leadership to demand the splitting up of large farms was successful in some parts of the country. "The Plowmen's" Front, which had been collaborating with the Communists for a long time, also worked successfully in this direction.

The party, continues Frunza, then proceeded to coin a number of slogans commensurate with the level of understanding of the masses at that particular time and reflecting their immediate interests. The FND (Frontul National Democrat, National Democratic Front) platform, drawn up in agreement with the Social Democratic Party, called for democratic government and an agrarian reform, besides continuation of the antifascist war in alliance with the USSR. The agrarian reform

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plank was mainly responsible for the achievement of the worker-peasant alliance, under the leadership of the workers. The party was also successful in winning over a part of the bourgeoisie -- a development constituting one of the characteristics of the first phase of the revolution in Rumania. Another characteristic was the seizure by workers, led by the party, of the seats of local government in tens of cities.

On 6 March 1945, Frunza goes on, the "people's democratic" regime seized power. "The presence of the liberating Soviet troops, although they did not interfere in the internal struggle, played a gigantic part in developments, for it encouraged the masses and paralyzed the attempts of the reactionary forces.... Radescu was not able to start a civil war." From then on, Frunza says, the state power became an instrument in the hands of the masses, instead of a means of repressing them.

The 1946 elections, in which the Communists obtained 70 percent of the votes, were, according to Frunza, the first in which voting was universal, equal, and secret. They were followed by legislation aiming at weakening capitalism, which finally led the bourgeois elements in the government to attempts at sabotaging the people's power and at collaborating with foreign imperialists. At the same time "the class struggle acquired a deeper content in the villages." In the beginning even the kulaks had been interested in land expropriation, as they hoped to profit from it themselves and to get rid of their chief rivals for the exploitation of the peasants. But after the land reform, the contradictions between the village bourgeois and the poor peasants reappeared, and the worker-peasant alliance was raised to a higher level, changing from an instrument directed against the large landowners into a force directed against capitalism. As at the same time the 1947 trade union elections demonstrated the workers' faith in the United Workers Front, it was plain that the balance of power had shifted in favor of the workers and their allies. The way was clear to pass on from the first stage of the revolution -- completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution -- to the next higher stage, the socialist revolution. The last representatives of the bourgeoisie in the government were eliminated and the monarchy was abolished. The peculiar trait of this revolution was, as Gheorghiu-Dej has said, that it was achieved by the state power itself. However, Frunza points out, that was only made possible by the existence of the USSR and the changes in favor of socialism in the world balance of power. The political developments in Rumania demonstrate that by adhering strictly to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and adapting them to concrete Rumanian conditions, the party was able successfully to activate the masses and to raise them to the level at which they realized the necessity of socialism.

As for the future, the road is obvious, the author states, for the Second Party Congress has already charted it: constant activation of the workers by the Party and strengthening party ties with the masses. The former aim can best be achieved by improvement of trade union work and extension of cooperation in the villages, the latter by developing the people's councils, which are both organs of state power and mass organizations.

Activation of the mass of party members will in future be greatly facilitated by the removal of one of the chief obstacles, the cult of personality, the author concludes.

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Socialist Agriculture

In the introduction to his article (pages 56-66) on the superiority of large-scale socialist agriculture, O. Parpala repeats the familiar Marxist contention that, as proved once again by developments in the US, progress in agriculture in capitalist countries can only be achieved at the expense of ruining the small farmer, while it can be achieved under socialism by the free union of farmers in large agricultural enterprises. The best proof is said to be the experience of the USSR, where "for the first time in history, the Soviet peasantry united freely in large socialist farms."

According to Parpala, the theories of earlier Rumanian economists and politicians, who, like Madgearu, maintained that small farms were not only viable but superior to large ones, were wrong. The Communist-inspired agrarian reform in 1945 did, indeed, "greatly" increase the number of small farms, but it represented a progress, because it "freed agriculture from the survivals of feudal relations of production," and furthermore, because the peasants are now assisted by the state. However, the agrarian reform was only a step toward the improvement of the peasant's lot, for the peasant's real welfare can be attained by large-scale socialist farming alone.

Parpala lists the familiar arguments in favor of large farm units, the chief one being the efficient utilization of power equipment, which is practically impossible when the average peasant holding is 3 hectares, divided on the average into 0.4-hectare strips, often widely separated. In 1955, the use of reaper binders on collective farms saved 1.3 million man-days and the use of cultivators, 300,000 days.

Large-scale mechanized farming should not only do better work, but also reduce costs, but unfortunately, the author admits, "this problem has not received the systematic attention of the heads of socialist farms" or even of agricultural economists, and in spite of the increased per-hectare production under socialism on individual as well as on socialist farms, the supply of farm products has not kept pace with the increased demand. The only way to remedy this situation is to expand the area of large socialist farm units.

Party Life

This section (pages 67-75) is devoted to a discussion by E. Demian of party apparatus work. The author refers to a recent decision (no date given) of the Political Bureau of the Rumanian Workers Party concerning improvement of the structure of the regiune, raion, and city party committee apparatuses, indicating that it refers to increasing the number of specialized sections, particularly economic; to the creation of posts of deputy section chiefs; to raising the number of committee secretaries to two; and to other matters. He outlines the principles which should govern the activities of members of the party apparatus.

Party Information

This section (pages 75-78) contains a description of the activities of the Odorhei Raion Party Committee in the field of socialization of agriculture, to serve as an example for other committees.

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Lessons and Consultations

The subject of this month's lesson (pages 78-94) is the activity of the Rumanian Communist Party during the 1929-1933 economic depression.

Answers to Readers

Answers are given to questions on the various roads to socialism, and on various problems of party organization (pages 94-106).

From the Communist Party Press

In this section are published this month the conclusions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party (pages 107-113); a review, by C. Arnautu, of the ideological struggle in capitalist countries, as reflected in their "progressive" periodicals (pages 113-118); and a review of the first issue of the periodical Estudios published by the Communist Party of Uruguay (pages 118-121).

Criticism and Bibliography

This section (pages 122-126) contains a critical article on the newspaper Drum Nou, organ of the Stalin Regiune Party Committee and People's Council. The paper is criticized for lack of combativity in its handling of industrial problems.

Notes

In this section (pages 126-128), N. Marcu takes issue with a number of statements made by H. Culea in an article on the reactionary character of the slogan, "Rumania, an eminently agricultural country," which appeared in the periodical Cercetari Filosofice, No 3, 1955.

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